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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900166 
v. : 
WILFRED A. VIGIL, JR., : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an interlocutory appeal by defendant in a 
prosecution for second degree murder, a first degree felony, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) (1990), and attempted 
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-203(l)(a)-(c) and 76-4-101 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court correctly ruled that defendant could be prosecuted for 
attempted second degree murder under the depraved indifference 
alternative defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990). 
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction 
of error" standard of review applies. City of Monticello v. 
1 
Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. Ill S. Ct. 
120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 
(Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Wifred A. Vigil, Jr., was charged with one 
count of second degree murder, a first degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) (1990), and two counts of 
attempted second degree murder, a second degree felony, under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(1)(a)-(c) and 76-4-101 (1990) (R. 6-
8). 
Defendant moved to dismiss the attempted second degree 
murder counts that were based on the depraved indifference 
alternative defined in section 76-5-203(1)(c) (R. 42-43). The 
trial court denied defendant's motion. 
Defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal 
under rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c) (Supp. 1989) (repealed effective July 1, 
1990J1, requesting review of the trial court's denial of the 
motion to dismiss (R. 87-93). This Court granted the petition. 
1
 A criminal defendant's right to appeal an interlocutory 
order is now contained in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l)(c) (Supp. 
1990). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, a statement of facts much 
beyond those set forth in the Statement of the Case is not 
necessary. The only additional fact that may serve to put the 
issue presented into perspective is that the charges against 
defendant arose out of his shooting a rifle into a crowd, killing 
one person and wounding two others (see Information, R. 8; 
Plaintiff's Memorandum at 3, R. 65). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under Utah's attempt and second degree murder statutes, 
defendant can be prosecuted for attempted murder based upon the 
depraved indifference alternative. This conclusion is consistent 
with the Model Penal Code's definition of attempt, upon which 
Utah's attempt statute is based, and this Court's construction of 
the depraved indifference murder statute. 
ARGUMENT 
UNDER UTAH'S ATTEMPT AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
STATUTES, DEFENDANT CAN BE PROSECUTED FOR 
ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER BASED ON THE 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE ALTERNATIVE. 
Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled 
that he could be prosecuted for attempted murder under the 
depraved indifference second degree murder alternative defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) (1990)2. Citing a number of 
2
 Section 76-5-203(1)(c) provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
. . . 
(c) acting under circumstances 
3 
decisions of this Court in homicide cases and referring to the 
language of the attempt statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 
(1990)3, he presents a straightforward argument that attempted 
murder requires an intent to kill, a mental state he correctly 
asserts is not an element of the depraved indifference 
alternative. Although the Utah cases relied upon by defendant— 
none of which addresses the precise issue presented in this 
case—could be read to suggest that the crime of attempted 
depraved indifference murder does not exist in Utah, a close 
reading of those cases, coupled with an examination of the Model 
Penal Code provision upon which Utah's attempt statute is based, 
leads to the conclusion that such a crime does exist. 
As noted by defendant, in State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1984), this Court interpreted section 76-5-203(1)(c) 
to require proof of the following elements: 
evidencing a depraved indifference 
to human life, he [sic] engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk 
of death to another and thereby 
causes the death of another[.] 
3
 Section 76-4-101 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of 
culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not 
constitute a substantial step unless it is strongly 
corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense. 
4 
1. The defendant engaged in conduct that 
created a grave risk of death to another; and 
2. At the time he so acted, the defendant 
knew that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another; and 
3. The circumstances under which the 
defendant acted, objectively viewed by a 
reasonable man rather than subjectively by 
the actual state of defendant's mindf were 
such as to evidence a depraved indifference 
to human life; and 
4. The defendant thereby unlawfully caused 
the death of another. 
680 P.2d at 1047. Critical to the issue presented in this case 
is the Court's conclusion that the statute requires that "the 
defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct created a grave 
risk of death to another." Ibid, (footnote omitted) (emphasis 
added). The Fontana Court made clear that the knowledge element 
for subsection (l)(c) differs from the knowledge element for 
subsection (l)(a)A only in degree: 
The "knowingly" requirement of subsection 
(a) specifies a prospect of death approaching 
certainty ("reasonably certain to cause"), 
but this subsection focuses on the 
prospective death of a particular person—the 
one whose death was actually caused. In 
contrast, subsection (c) is satisfied by a 
"grave risk" of death, but this subsection 
can refer to the risk defendant's conduct 
4
 Section 76-5-203(1)(a) provides: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly 
causes the death of another[.] 
5 
imposes on people generally, not just on the person 
whose death is actually caused. 
Ibid, (citation omitted). 
In State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988), the 
Court further refined the definition of depraved indifference 
murder, holding that "grave risk of death" as used in section 76-
5-203(1) (c) "means a highly likely probability that death will 
result from a risk that the defendant knowingly creates." Jlci. at 
264 (emphasis in original)5. And, Standiford reaffirmed the 
view expressed in State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Utah 
1985), that the mens rea of depraved indifference murder (i.e., 
knowledge of a grave risk of death) is "'equivalent to a 
'specific intent' [or a purpose] to kill.'" .Id. at 261 (quoting 
Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d at 1220) (brackets and emphasis in original). 
With the foregoing principles in mind, the central 
issue of whether the crime of depraved indifference murder exists 
in Utah can now be examined. In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 
(Utah 1989), this Court made clear that simply because one can be 
convicted of second degree murder under one of the four 
alternatives defined in sections 76-5-203(1)(a)-(d), that does 
not necessarily mean that a conviction of attempted murder is 
also possible for each alternative. There, the Court held that 
5
 This refinement distinguishes depraved indifference murder 
from reckless manslaughter and the "substantial and unjustifiable 
risk" of death associated with that crime. 769 P.2d at 264. In 
short, "[t]his standard is less than what is required for an 
intentional or knowing murder, but greater than what is required 
for reckless manslaughter." Ibid. 
6 
attempted felony murder (section 76-5-203(1)(d)) does not exist 
in Utah because "the crime of attempted murder requires proof of 
intent to kill." 785 P.2d at 394. Defendant relies heavily on 
the quoted language as support for his argument that the crime of 
attempted depraved indifference murder does not exist in Utah. 
However, defendant reads too much into that language, failing to 
consider it in the context of the narrow issue presented in Bell 
and ignoring the concept that the mens rea of depraved 
indifference is equivalent to an intent or purpose to kill, 
Standiford, 769 P.2d at 261. Defendant's argument also fails to 
consider the philosophy that underpins the Model Penal Code's 
attempt provision, from which Utah's attempt statute is derived. 
In Bell, the sole issue before the Court was whether 
one could be convicted of attempted felony murder under Utah's 
second degree murder statute; the depraved indifference 
alternative was not considered. In holding that attempted felony 
murder does not exist in Utah, the Court emphasized that felony 
murder, insofar as the homicide is concerned, does not require 
proof of any culpable mental state. 785 P.2d at 393-94. Thus, 
felony murder is a distinctly different crime from depraved 
indifference murder, which requires proof of a highly culpable 
mental state. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 259 (subsections (l)(a) 
through (c) "are comparable to the old malice aforethought"). 
Accordingly, the Court's seemingly broad statement in Bell that 
attempted murder requires proof of intent to kill is most 
7 
reasonably read as a recognition that attempted murder requires 
an intent to kill or a mental state that is equivalent thereto. 
Utah's attempt statute, section 76-4-101, is derived 
from the Model Penal Code. State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 
(Utah 1984) (per curiam); Model Penal Code, art. 5, § 5.01 (1985) 
(hereafter "MPC")6. A comment to MPC § 5.01 gives the following 
illustration of attempted murders 
Subsection (l)(b) [of § 5.01] provides 
that when causing a particular result is an 
element of the crime, as in homicide cases . 
. ., an actor commits an attempt when he does 
or omits to do anything with the purpose of 
causing "or with the belief that it will 
cause" such result without further conduct on 
his part. Thus, a belief that death will 
ensue from the actor's conduct . . . will 
6
 Section 5.01 provides in pertinent part:-
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for commission of the crime, he 
(a) purposely engages in conduct that would 
constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as he believes them to be; 
or 
(b) when causing a particular 
result is an element of the crime, 
does or omits to do anything with 
the purpose of causing or with the 
belief that it will cause such 
result without further conduct on 
his part; or 
(c) purposely does or omits to do 
anything that, under the 
circumstances as he believes them 
to be, is an act or omission 
constituting a substantial step in 
a course of conduct planned to 
culminate in his commission of the 
crime. 
8 
suffice, as would a purpose to bring about 
those results. If, for example, the actor's 
purpose were to demolish a building and, 
knowing that persons were in the building and 
they would be killed by the explosion, he 
nevertheless detonated a bomb that turned out 
to be defective, he could be prosecuted for 
attempted murder even though it was no part 
of his purpose that the inhabitants of the 
building would be killed. 
It is difficult to say what the decision 
would be under prevailing attempt principles 
in a case of this kind. It might be held 
that the actor did not specifically intend to 
kill the inhabitants of the building; on the 
other hand, the concept of "intent" has 
always been an ambiguous one and might be 
thought to include results that the actor 
believed to be the inevitable consequence of 
his conduct. In any event, the inclusion of 
such conduct as the basis for liability under 
Subsection (l)(b) is based on the conclusion 
that the manifestation of the actor's 
dangerousness is just as great—or very 
nearly as great—as in the case of purposive 
conduct. In both instances a deliberate 
choice is made to bring about the consequence 
forbidden by the criminal laws, and the actor 
has done all within his power to cause this 
result to occur. The absence of any desire 
that the result occur is not, under the 
circumstances, a sufficient basis for 
differentiating between the two types of 
conduct involved. . . . 
MPC, art. 5, § 5.01 comment 2, at 304-05. Although this comment 
points out that "[o]nly a minority of recent revisions have 
explicitly followed the Model Code on this point," .id. at 305 
(emphasis added), the comment's example of attempted murder where 
there is no actual intent to kill, but rather a mental state of 
equivalent dangerousness (i.e., knowledge or belief that death 
will occur), fits well with this Court's concept that the mens 
rea for depraved indifference is equivalent to an intent or 
9 
purpose to kill. Indeed, the facts of the instant case, where 
defendant shot a rifle into a crowd, closely parallel the example 
given• 
The courts are split as to whether the offense of 
attempted murder requires an intent to kill. Some courts have 
held that attempted murder can exist only when there is an intent 
to kill; some lesser mental state, including a "knowing" mental 
state, is not sufficient. E.g. State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251, 
1252-53 (Me. 1984)7; State v. Mitchell, 98 Ill.App.3d 398, 53 
7
 The Huff case, which defendant relies on and which was 
relied on by this Court in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d at 393, 
construes an attempt statute which, although similar to Utah's, 
contains a significant phrase that does not appear in the Utah 
statute. Under Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 152(1) (1983), 
"[a] person is guilty of criminal attempt if, acting with the 
kind of culpability required for the commission of the crime, and 
with the intent to complete the commission of the crime, he 
engages in conduct which, in fact, constitutes a substantial step 
toward its commission" (emphasis added). The italicized 
language, which does not appear in Utah's attempt statute, was 
critical to the Huff court's conclusion that attempted murder 
necessarily requires an intent to kill: 
Under . . . § 152(1), a person is guilty 
of criminal attempt if he acts with intent to 
complete the commission of the target 
offense. Where a discrepancy exists in the 
culpable mental states between criminal 
attempt and the offense attempted, the 
criminal attempt to commit such a crime is a 
"logical impossibility." . . . Thus, . . . 
[a]n actor . . . cannot intend to act . . . 
"knowingly". 
469 A.2d at 1253 (emphasis added). Neither the Bell Court nor 
defendant notes this important distinction between the Maine and 
Utah attempt statutes. 
While it might be argued that the "intent" language of 
Maine's statute is essentially the same as that which appears in 
subsection (2) of section 76-4-101 ("For purposes of this part, 
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is 
10 
111.Dec. 867, 424 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1981). Other courts have held 
that attempted murder can be committed with an intentional or 
knowing mental state. E.g. Gelabert v. State, 712 S.W.2d 813, 
817-18 (Tex. App. 1986); Gentry v. State, 437 So.2d 1097, 1098-99 
(Fla. 1983). A similar split exists on the specific issue of 
whether the crime of attempted depraved indifference murder 
exists. Compare State v. Johnson. 103 N.M. 364, 707 P.2d 1174, 
1177-79 (N.M. App.) (crime of attempted "depraved mind" murder 
does not exist), cert, quashed, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (N.M. 
1985); with People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Colo. 1983) 
(en banc) (crime of attempted "extreme indifference" murder does 
exist). Although admittedly a difficult question, the better 
view, and the one most consistent with the Model Penal Code and 
this Court's conclusion that the mens rea for depraved 
indifference murder is equivalent to an intent to kill, is that 
the crime of attempted depraved indifference murder exists in 
Utah8. Such a conclusion implements the clear bias in modern 
criminal jurisprudence "toward punishing an actor's [culpable 
strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense."), Maine's statute contains the subsection (2) language 
in addition to the "intent" language that has been discussed. 
See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 152(1). Therefore, taken in 
context, the subsection (2) language can be read less 
restrictively than the Maine statute, and reasonably be 
interpreted to refer to conduct that is strongly corroborative of 
an intentional mental state or one equivalent thereto. 
8
 This Court's characterization of the depraved indifference 
mens rea as being equivalent to an intent to kill is what 
distinguishes the instant case from State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237 
(Utah 1978), which held that there cannot be an attempt to commit 
manslaughter under the reckless homicide alternative of that 
crime, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1)(a) (1990). Recklessness 
cannot be equated with an intent to kill. Norman, 580 P.2d at 
239-40. 11 
mental state] instead of simply punishing the manifest 
criminality or outwardly criminal act." State v. Pappas, 705 
P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1989). As recognized by this Court, the 
legislature has sought "to punish subjective criminality so long 
as it is linked with some . . . corroborative act that 
demonstrates the firmness of the actor's criminal resolve." 
Ibid. 
This Court should follow the reasoning of Castro, where 
the Colorado Supreme Court, construing an attempt statute nearly 
identical to Utah's and an "extreme indifference" murder statute 
very similar to section 76-5-203(1)(c)9, recognized that one 
could attempt "extreme indifference" murder because that crime, 
"while not requiring a conscious object to kill, necessitates a 
conscious object to engage in conduct that creates a grave risk 
of death to another." 657 P.2d at 938. Noting that "[t]he crime 
of extreme indifference murder requires an intentional state of 
mind with respect to proscribed conduct[,] [in that] [t]he actor 
must be aware of his conduct and have a conscious object to 
engage in it," the court rejected "the defendant's assertion that 
the crime of extreme indifference murder requires an intent to 
commit an unintentional act." Id. at 938. ££. State v. Johnson, 
707 P.2d at 1178 ("Thus, an attempt to commit [depraved mind 
murder] would seem to require proof that a defendant intended to 
perpetrate an unintentional killing—which is logically 
9
 See Castro, 657 P.2d at 937 (setting forth elements of 
attempt and extreme indifference murder). 
12 
impossible." (brackets and emphasis in original)). Where a 
highly culpable mental state is present, indeed one that is 
equivalent to an intent to kill, there appears to be no good 
reason to preclude an attempted murder conviction—the only fact 
separating the defendant from a murder conviction being the 
fortuity that a death did not occur. See Gentry v. State, 437 
So.2d at 1099. 
In sum, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant 
could be prosecuted for attempted second degree murder under the 
depraved indifference alternative. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to 
dismiss and remand the case for trial on the charges as filed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J^J^day of April, 1991. 
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